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Towards a Cybernetics
of (Mass-Media) Institutions
By
Klaus Krippendorff
The Annenberg School for Communication
University ofPennsylvania

l

Backqround
1 met George Gerbner on one of those typically midwestern ,
ice cold , windy and snowless days , between Christmas and New Year
1961 , at the University of Illinois ’ Institute of Communication
Research in Urbana.
1 had graduated from the internationally famed avant-garde
design school in Ulm , Germany , spent a year at its Institute for
visual Perception and had come to the U.S. full of far-out ideas
about a new synthesis between art , information theory , symbolic
interaction , communication , cybernetics , sociology , all focussed
。n

my main concern , design.

To my utter disappointment and

barely able to defend myself in English , 1 found myself
photographed instead in front of the rat cages at princeton
University and introduced in one of its newsletters as a German
psychologist (by implications interested in American rats).
Hadley Cantril , whom 1 had known through his early work on public
。pinion

and who had just left this psychology department for

reasons similar to why 1 was now discouraged gave me a few
addresses and the advice to look for a better place to study.
talked to well known scholars at

Har、rard ，

1

MIT , University of

Michigan and when 1 stumbled into Michigan State University ,
David Berlo and Malcolm McLean immediately offered me an
assistantship.

But when 1 inquired about who would be concerned

with the social aspects of communication they pointed to the
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University of Illinois , Dallas Smythe and George Gerbner who had
already been on Hadley cantril ’ s lis t.
The Institute of communication Research was attractive to me
not only for its social concerns but also for its liberally
administered communication program.

It enabled me to study

cybernetics seriously , expand my knowledge in anthropology ,
sociology , social psychology and linguistics and brought me in
contact with a variety of esoteric areas then blowing through the
campus.

But communication became my new home and George Gerbner

my initial advisor.
George taught two courses , one on popular culture and
another on social aspects of mass communication.

Both were

informed by his general model of communication , the notion that
mass communication works very much like industrial production ,
Leo Loewenthal (1944)
(1951 , 1962)

,

and Marshall McLuhan ’ s cultural criticism ,

initially only his Mechanica1

Br촉효g ，

and by content

analysis results.
George ’ s

딛르E르E르1 뀐으약르L 으.f Q。mmunicati 。n

(1956) essentially

was a contextualization of his early journalistic experiences
extended to any kind of social agency.
。bserver

It starts with an

of reality: "someone--perceives an event--" and

continues with what he , she or it intends to do with it , "and
reacts--in a situation--through some means--to make available
materials--in some form--and context ," and , noting what such an
activity entails , "--conveying content--of some consequence."

It

was an expansion on Harold Lasswell ’ s "who--says what--to whom--

3
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formula (1948) and associated with each of these verbal

components an area of study or research questions he asked his
students to explore.

Much of his own research sought

t。

illustrate the role these components play in shaping
communication.
The idea that mass communication resembled more the
lin으 으t:

효흐흐르꾀뇨lY

industrial productiorthan the popular image of a

critical journalist ’ s or artist ’ s mind came to him from his halfbrother Laslo Benedik , a successful film maker with considerable
experiences inside Hollywood.

The metaphor of industrial

production not only suggested a way of demystifying Hollywood ,
analyzing its politics , procedures , controls , financial and
material resources of the communication industry in familiar
terms , but also opened the door to Marxist criticism , describing
communication as the mass production and dissemination of
messa잉 es

and paying attention to its institutional structure , its

hidden ideological biases , its economic power bases and the
corporate interests it served.
。 utspoken

In Urbana , George was an

representative of this perspective.

Following Harold Innis ’ footsteps , Marshall McLuhan ’ s early
work had introduced 2으E브L효K f'.브 lt브ζ르 notions and culture critical
attitudes towards the transformations mass-media (including
literature , magazines , newspapers and television) were thought
introduce into everyone ’ s life by their own symbolic powers.
McLuhan put these media into the center of his understanding
society , just as George described them as the principal

t。
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humanizing agents and reconstructed the whole human history in
these terms.

For George , popular culture and mass production

were two , perhaps unequally favoured , sides of the same coin.
The backbone of George ’ s research always was and still is
드으ntent 효E르.l.Yli후흐

Whereas

others sought to find ways of using

verbal data to infer psychological states and association
structures in speakers ’ and hearers ’ minds , notably Charles
Osgood , who was George ’ s colleague and director of the Institute ,
。r

got involved in evaluating press performance by journalistic

standards , George never appreciated psychological research , had
no

lon당 er

journalistic concerns and saw mass-media content as the

principal phenomena that communication research needed
explain.

Loewenthal ’ s work

t。

on popular heroes in magazines

fiction , perhaps also Siegfried Kracauer ’ s analysis of popular
films and Paul Lazarsfeld ’ s distinction between administrative
and critical communications research became cornerstones of this
effort.
In fact , even in his working definitions of communication
and in his later delineation of the field of communication (1966)
messages became pivotal:
Communication can be defined as "social interaction
through messages." Messages are formally coded , symbolic ,
。 r representational events of some shared significance in a
culture , ... The distinction between the "communication
approach" and other approaches to the study of behavior and
culture rests on the extent to which (1) messages are
germane to the process studied and (2) concern with the
production , content , transmission , perception and use of
messages is central to the approach. A "communication
approach" (or theory) can be distinguished from others in

5

that it makes the nature and role of messages in life and
society its central organizing concern. (1967a)
Although George never talked about his epistemology , he
always considered messages as objective events that , because of
their "formally coded symbolic ,

... representational"

and

"imprinted" nature , have a factuality as unquestionable as the
events they represent.

This conviction led him to regard

messages as part of an objective reality to be "unveiled" or
"uncovered" without reference to an analyst ’ s epistemology ,
theory or values and without reference to how people might
interpret them in public.

He states:

。ur contention is not so much that inherent physical
characteristics of media as such , or that formal elements of
style , vocabulary , syntax , are themselves of profound and
direct significance. Rather it is that the nature and
consequences of these elements and characteristics can be
understood best if content is viewed as bearing the imprint
。 f social needs and uses ... Aside from the formal ,
conventional "message ," mass-media content bears the imprint
。 f concrete circumstances of its creation.
This includes
such things as external outlook and the internal dynamics of
the producing industry; its relationship to competitors; its
control over resources , facilities of production , and
distribution; the position of its decision makers in the
industrial structure; their relationships to audiences ,
markets , advertising sponsors. Out of these come a set of
managerial assumptions--both implicit and rationalized-reflected in large systems of content , and performing some
aspect of its perception. The social determinants of
cultural industry thus find their way into the consequential
meaning of the material ... Unless the requirements and
effects of a specific system of industrial and market
relationships (such as the corporate structure) are fully
grasped , mass-media content analysis remains superficial.
(1958b) .

Thus , although George consistently defines messages in terms
。f

".ê뇨흐 red .ê ianificancg"

,

seeks to show "what they call to the

6

attentions 으1: 르 으으꾀핀브E후.ty" and to reveal "what stories tell 브특"
his content analysis play down the importance of conventional
meanings and emic categories (the kind of understanding that
members of a community could agree with or share)

and the truth

value of what these messages are about (what people see as
factual or merely entertaining).

within the analytical

presupposition that communication is

"industrial behavior in the

public domain , " which can hardly be considered shared among
audience members , his analyses are designed instead to uncover
what he regards as the hidden , unintended , implicit and pervasive
aspects of messages that escape casual reading but are
。bjectively

identifiable by qualified analysts , perhaps aided by

statistical tools.
Consequently , George ’ s research seeks to
￡ζ트요브르낀흐ygistributionâ

expl효후n .t뇨르

in his own etic categories by (a)

interpreting them as standard indicators , by (b) correlating
these indicators with measurable variables of popular message
consumption , to which mass production is just the other side of
the same coin , and (c) by putting (a) and (b) into cultural ,
social , political and economic explanatory perspectives.

Figure

1 (which already includes a distinction 1 want to discuss later)
shows these relationships graphically:

Figure 1
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To give some examples for each , regarding (a)

,

George

interpreted the frequencies of occurrences in subject matter
categories as measures of attention and used these measures
quantify media attention to mental illness (1959)
in six countries (1969b)
and Marvanyi , 1977)

,

t。

, to film heroes

, to countries outside the U.S. (Gerbner

among many others.

Regarding (b)

,

efforts

to correlate content variables with other measures served to show
the "imprinting" of

messa양 e

characteristics and provide evidence

for their social consequences.

For example , in his "Social

Anatomy of the Romance Confession Cover Girl" he correlated
visual characteristics of magazine covers with semantic
differential ratings by subjects (1958a).

In his and Larry

Gross ’ "Scary World of TV ’ s Heavy Viewer" he compared frequencies
。f

violence in TV with survey data on the perception of real-

world violence (1976) to which one may add numerous similar
comparisons of TV populations with real populations , TV crime
statistics with official crime statistics and TV attitudes with
those found by actual surveys.
While George ’ s quantitative work was simple and

strai 양ht

forward and perhaps for these reasons not always accepted (e.g.
Hirsch , 1980)

,

George ’ s main strength is (c)

,

to find challenging

socio-political interpretations of his content analysis counts.
He explained the social role of magazines in terms of where , by
whom , to whom and in whose interest magazines would be sold
(1958a)

,

differences in reporting an alleged crime in terms of

the known ideological perspectives and political tendencies of

g

newspapers (1964)

,

the portrayal of mental illness in terms of

hidden censorship and industry-wide controls in motion pictures
(Gerbner and Tannenbaum , 1962) and later moved towards more
cultural interpretations in terms of mainstreaming industrially
profitable perceptions (Gerbner , Gross , Morgan & Signorielli ,
1986) on the one hand and power roles of decision makers
regarding communication content (1969a , 1974) on the other.

His

characterization of "Television as a New Religion" based on the
global , instantaneous and ritualized access by few individuals

t。

the largest number of people in history (1977b , 1980 , 1982;
Gerbner & Connolly , 1978) is a similarly challenging
interpretation.
1 always was intrigued with the novel connections George
made , with his far-reaching interpretations and exploratory
constructions.

At the same time 1 also felt uncomfortable with

explaining communication content as "objective industrial c"
whose sheer massive presence would suffice to claim widespread
sharing without the need to refer to possibly diverse
understandings.

Correlating (in the statistical sense) etic

content categories with equally etic consumption variables and
attitudes makes no allowance for individual choices to interpret
texts differently either and when accepted as scientific findings
perhaps even discourages new and deviant perspectives or raising
questions of how society might be changed.

The lack of freedom

George attributed to readers , viewers and even producers , to the

9

public for short , stands in sharp contrast with the freedom he
himself displays in developing his own ideas.
Disagreements with a respected teacher makes one think on
。ne ’ s

own and since 1 always learned most from teachers that

challenged my presuppositions , my course of study with George
proved productive for me as well.

In my University of Illinois

Ph.D. dissertation , written after 1 had joined George at the
Annenberg School , 1 sought to develop a new epistemological
perspective for content analysis , one that was grounded in a
contextual theory of meaning 1 had been playing with before and
required the analyst to actively participate in the construction
。f

the relationships between text and context , whether it

concerned relationships between words and their linguistic
surroundings , between social organizations and their sociocultural environments or between data and a theoretical framework
chosen by the analyst.

The context of data did not need to be

true in an objectifies sense but cognized by the analyst and , in
the case of content analysis , empirically relevant and
convincingly stated (e.g. Krippendorff , 1980). This kind of
content analysis did not rule out causal connections , for example
imprinting , but granted the communicators assumed to be involved
the competence of making the same creative choices of contexts
and meanings researchers like George would take for granted for
themselves.
As its Dean , The Annenberg School provided George
considerable resources and , having argued that messages should

10

not be seen in isolation but as connected and
。 ther ’ s

reinforcin당

each

consequences , he sought to move further away from

traditional notions of "content" and engage instead in what he
’ηnessage

called

systems analysis."

The first of these large scale projects was commissioned in
1968 by the U.S. Surgeon General and concerned violence on TV.
It came unanticipated.

George felt unable to do it on its own

and so , several of us at the Annenberg SChool ,

bringin양

different

backgrounds and analytical competencies to the task , collaborated
。n

what turned out to be a tremendously exciting effort (Brouwer ,

Clark , Gerbner & Krippendorff , 1969).
The initial success of such efforts and a content analysis
conference we organized in 1967 encouraged George to build a
superstructure on top of message systems analysis: the cultural
indicators project.
"institutions
messa당 e

(1972)

,

Based on his continued conceptions that

packa당e ，

media compose , and technologies release

systems into the mainstream of common consciousness"
his cultural indicators project intended to be the most

ambitious and global effort to take stock of mass-media ’ s farreaching involvement in cultural affairs.

Seeking to build a

cumulative data base for policy makers to make informed decisions
in the cultural domain (1969a)
。 riented

,

he differentiated his own policy

approach from those that responded either to burning

political issues "dear to the heart of a political clientele" or
to industrial and business interests in the mass-media , summarily

11

characterizing them as tactical approaches (1967b)
(see Figure 1).
There had been precedences , of course.
Tenney (1912)

For example Alvan A.

(a founding contributor of the Columbia Schoo1 of

Journalism) proposed a nation wide and continuous effort

t。

monitor and record major changes in the politica1 climate and
public consciousness by a systematic and quantitative analysis of
newspaper content "comparable in accuracy (and intent) to the
statistics of the united States Weather Bureau".

Tenney ’ s ideas

stimulated many quantitative newspaper analyses but the
unavai1ability of computational devices at that time frustrated
the extent of his proposal.

with computers now on hand , George ’ s

similarly global questions had a better chance.
For his cultural indicators project , George defined three
components of which message systems analysis was one:
How mass-media relate to other institutions , make
decisions , compose message systems , and perform their
functions in society are questions for institutiona1 m;:으므르흐E
효끄흐lYê.후A (later also called "institutional policy analysis"
1985:17); how large bodies of messages can be observed as
dynamic systems with symbolic functions that have social
consequences is the question of 센g흐흐효~ sys후르핀등 료E효lYê.후2;
and what common assumptions , points of view , images , and
associations do the message systems tend to cultivate in
large and heterogeneous communities , and with what public
policy implications , are problems for çultivati 。n 르E르lYê.후E
(1973:558) .
。f

the three , the institutional component is least developed

and clear.

In his initial conception for an institutional

process analysis , he outlines a scheme for analyzing decision
makers that do affect what the media communicate in terms of

12
their power bases , the type of leverage they command , the
functions they perform , and the domain of mass-media operations
in which these decisions are exercised.

Decision makers could be

individuals or groups and the source of their power is seen as
residing in the structure of the institutional roles with
leverage built into each (1973:558-562).

Although George could

relate several of his own earlier studies to this "first prong"
。f

cultural indicators research and added a cross-classification

。f

nine types of power roles , he recently observed: "Because of

its direct policy orientation , this research is the most
difficult to fund and , therefore , the least developed (Gerbner ,
Gross , Morgan & Signorielli , 1986).
Against the backdrop of the foregoing , 1 want to make a
contribution to this area of mass-communication research and
。utline

here an approach to the analysis of social institutions.

1 fully concur with George ’ s critical spirit , with the large
scope of social concerns he expresses , and am equally convinced
。f

the central role of communication in society.

The title of

this paper contains "mass-media" in parentheses to indicate my
uncertainty or perhaps unwillingness to draw a boundary around
。 ne

industry or one technology and understand it by such an

exclusive focus.

The inclusion of agencies that connect with

mass communication requires first of all a more
으i 르E효lY득후흐

Second

gncomoassin다

unit

and consistent with my experiences that

communication is a process , not a thing , and one that involves
people in its own way , it needs a more

뎌y.!l효핀후으 흐E역 c 。 anizable
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￡ζ효꾀르쁘으 rk .f으E 르E르lY프후흐

Finally ，

1 am convinced that an adequate

understanding of human communication requires an goistemoloqy
으르E르뇨l응 으.f .ê elf-reflecti 。 n

which is different from one that would

suffice to understand rocks , computers , industrial production and
communication systems from the outside.

1 believe a cybernetic

epistemology informs such a framework , suggests appropriate units
。f

analysis and unfolds a more cogent kind of truth , one that

might be easier to live with than what the "scary world of
television" currently encourages.
The following can do no more than sketch out this framework ,
develop a skeleton of concepts , explore some general hypotheses
and suggest social implications.

Since the framework is new , 1

have to accept the blame for all faults and overstatements that
its repeated use would have weeded out , and since the space (and
time) is limited , 1 have to apologize for the necessarily terse
and definitional style.

All 1 can do is show where my thinking

goes and 1 will attempt to do this in eight sections:

*

Information

*

Noospheres and ecospheres

*
*
*
*

Institution

Mass-media ecology

*

A cybernetics of mass-media ecology

*

A cybernetics of cybernetics
for mass-communication research

Social organization
Ecology of social organizations

14

The first six sections define and elaborate on a few key
terms that exemplify the spirit of the approach I am taking.

The

seventh assembles them into a picture that communication
researchers might not find unfamiliar but is viewed here from an
unfamiliar perspective.

In the last section I am carrying this

perspective to its logical conclusion and return to a critique of
the concepts that I deliberately avoid in the picture I am
painting thus showing its divergence from George ’ s approach
media institutions.

t。

DNA

。 ntogenesis

eplgen~sls

1iving
organism

Figure

perturbations

2
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Information
The word "information" has many meanings
meaning.

includin앙

that of

1 will not review its etymology or alternative

conceptions and plunge right into the notion convenient here:
informati 。n 후흐 t뇨g 1.으g후으효1. 으1: 。 raanizational 꼬으 rk

르E효뇨4르등 후후흐 흐g으g호X르1:.t으 효으

example is DNA.

A

!! .Q효t호르 rn

prototypical though limiting

It consists of a particular string of genes

whose chemical substances do not really matter except for the
spacial configuration or pattern it manifests.

By itself DNA

knows nothing , does nothing , intends nothing , represents nothing ,
contains no significant amount of energy and quickly
disintegrates.

Only when implanted into a fertile environment , a

womb , does it start realizing its potential , engages a network of
interaction with available components , organizes them around
itself and thus coordinates the growth of a living organism ,
including the capacity to reproduce a copy of the very DNA that
initiated the process.

Thus , information is not energy , as

wiener (1948) always insisted , not a thing , not even a message
that could be separated from its context.

It indicates

효

g효호호르ζ~흐 E으호E쁘펀1. 호으 요브펴g 효낀 。 ntoaoneti Q .Q1:으으g흐를 whose

complement is the re-storing (bringing back to storage and
transmission) of DNA by an adult organism and is here called
epigenesis.

Both are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2
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1 am adding an arrow labeled perturbations to indicate that
the circular process takes place in a medium and may be subject
to mutation and other disturbances unknowable from the inside ,
causing the process of reproduction to drift.
In the social domain , blueprints , recipes , fairy tales and
TV shows have similar capabilities.

A blueprint , for example ,

when given to a building contractor who commands the necessary
human and material resources to build many kinds of structures ,
enables him to set an organizational process in motion that is
selective of people , coordinates their work , directs the flow of
materials and ultimately leaves a certain kind of building
behind.
tied

t。

Just as in DNA and in blueprints , information is always
르 。 articular 으으nt르xt

whose dynamics it directs.

The

blueprint probably means little to a cook whose recipes mean
little to a construction crew.

However , unlike DNA which is

exhaustive (specifies an organism ’ s growth process completely)
and deterministic (leaves little to chance)

,

blueprints and the

like leave their receivers considerable organizational options
including to reject them.

To build a house requires much more

information than a blueprint could provide (ranging from
knowledge of building codes to acquired professional skills)

,

and

the process could not be realized without providing some
collective benefit.

Also unlike DNA , artifacts or the processes

that produce them rarely create their own blueprints except with
the help of people that make images , tell stories , offer

17
descriptions , write organizational manuals or create theories
that eventually enable the very process they emerge from to be
recreated at another place , at another point in time and in a
different materiality.
If one were to analyze the information provided by a
socially relevant message in the context of such a cycle , one
would not ask what it physically contains , what it refers to or
what its appropriate paraphrases may be , but what it enables
someone to do with it , the activities it encourages or
constrains , the distinctions it

brin당 s

forth to someone , the role

it can play in a receiver ’ s life , the regulatory capability it
has in the face of given perturbations--all in the context of
required and available resources.

Kenneth Boulding (1978)

describes this information as "know how" not "know what."
Indeed , many crime stories invented for television have found
imitators and popular celebrities are adopted as models by
members of a community provided these receivers have the
resources and incentives to realize them in their own lives.
Asking questions regarding ontogenesis may bring us closer
understanding public media in the
뇨효llll르낀

t。

IIξ으으르흐등 으￡ 꾀aking 흐으으 iety

than asking the traditional questions of representation ,

content (correspondence and truth).
Generalizing the diagram for DNA to the social domain leads
us to Figure 3
Figure 3

know-how

re-storation

realization

perturbations

process

Figure

3
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In biology some say that living organisms are the clever
inventions of DNA to reproduce itself.

Others characterize DNA

as the endowment a parent organism passes to its offsprings.
What unites both views and generalizes to the social domain is
that the circularity :ru;:르흐르rv르등 호뇨르 g으ζ르nt후르1. 으i 흐11 ong으후119
g트ne흐후흐

Information

is an essential ingredient of society as

well , whether in the form of a continuous inter-translation of
theory and practice , public knowledge and everyday life or of
technol 。당 ical

know-how and the ecology of artifacts it keeps in

motion.
I am offering this concept of information also as a richer
alternative to the notion of power in social discourse but will
later comment on why.
N 。 osoheres

and ecosoheres

It is important to keep the enabling pattern , know-how or
information , analytically distinct from the actual processes they
enable to be realized else it is difficult to understand what
communication does.

In biology the distinction between genes and

living organisms and between a genosphere and a phenosphere
proved enormously productive.

Boulding (1978) draws an analogous

distinction between the 11으으.ê.!2뇨ere that contains all the know-how
knowledge available in a culture and the

르으으 sohe호르

that contains

all the artifacts a culture brings into interaction at a time ,
including socialized human beings and social organizations which
are man-made as well.

Following Carl G. Jung , Gregory and Mary

19
Catherine Bateson (1987) made a related distinction between
으ζ르효뇨묘ζ르，
I2.l르E으E효，

the world we draw distinctions in and thereby make , and
the world of undifferentiated continua that we know

nothing about but live in and that occasionally interferes with
。r

perturbs our actions.

Creatura embraces both of Boulding ’ s

spheres and 1 see pleroma as the medium in which the circular
processes of ontogenesis and epigenesis take recognizably place.
The distinction between a noosphere and an ecosphere is
particularly important in the light of the different processes
。perating

in either sphere.

Whereas physical interaction among

people , machines , natural resources , and large energy flows
clearly take their place in an ecosphere , the creation ,
construction , recombination (multi-sexual mating) of patterns
through perception , thinking and above all their communication
could be said to be defined in a noosphere.

Anatol Rapoport ’ s

proposal that content analysis be concerned with studying the
body of verbal corpses humans secrete into their environment as a
system (1969) and George Gerbner ’ s message systems analysis
(1969a) have

similar foci on the noosphere.

However , 1 like

t。

see the noosphere of a culture or society be analyzed neither as
secretion from an ecosphere nor as representative of something
but as :t뇨g f:eoositorv 으f'!!..뇨료:t 후흐 PhvsicallV 르 nd 흐으으후효l.l.Y p.으흐흐i뇨4르
within a culture.
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Institution
The words "institution" and "organization" are often used
George ’ s reference to mass-media institutions

interchangeably.

does not differentiate between them either.

1 believe a clear

distinction is essential to an understanding of how communication
enables the continuous creation of society.
Etymologically ,

instituti 。 n

comes from the act of

establishing , of giving order to a thing , regulation , but also an
established law , custom , usage or practice , a regulative
principle or convention.
。 rganism ，

。f

In contrast ,

。 rqanizati 。 n

comes from

the process of being organized , but also the structure

interdependent or subordinate elements whose relations and

properties are largely determined by their function in a whole
(Oxford English Dictionary , 1933).
Already in common discourse we distinguish between the
institution of family , for example , and a particular neighbor ’ s
family.

Positivist sociologists seek to construe the difference

as one between what is common to all existing families and the
particular incident of a family.

Although it is impossible

believe that ordinary people could know , are able to or care

t。
t。

find out what all families have in common , they do have a
reasonably clear idea of what a family is or should be when they
start one (even without first hand experiences in the role they
are then taking)

, when they decide who does or does not belong

(Jorgenson , 1986)

,

when they evaluate someone else ’ s family in

whichever terms , or when they decide whether a particular family
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is broken.

What a fami1y is is a1so instituted in written 1aw

and then guides judge ’ s decisions in divorce and chi1d custody
matters.

A particu1ar fami1y is a socia1 organization that

inc1udes rea1 peop1e in interaction and obtains its identity when
those invo1ved invoke the regu1ative princip1es of (their own
notion of) fami1y as an institution.
Let me then define an

instituti 。n 효흐 흐 므으낀르￡르nt 흐트.t 으i

individua1s

호으 c。 ordinatg th르호E

b르뇨르X후으E 후E후으 defin후 te 。 rqanizationa 1. 12효호후르프n

within a particu1ar

requ1ative princip1es

호뇨르.t 트E효뇨L트

domain (a1so see Eisenstadt , 1968).
interpersona1
후.t，

Institutions entai1 the

expectati 。n .t뇨효.t.t브으흐르

.t뇨g 흐es후조르 ξ으 뇨으뇨av트 흐흐 르x12 e 으 ted

deviation2 perceived in others.

interacted

쁘ith ç으nf으rm .t으

and a Ni11inqness

호으 효드호 으E

Besides an occasiona11y forma1

recognition by 1ega1 authorities , institutions are 1. eqitimizeg Qy
qeneratino

브E으1m으프트효 으!: 1!ncha11enqeg re으브ζE르nt interacti 。 n.

Institutions

르A등으 뇨흐ve n르잭g흐 흐 nd .1르nd .t뇨eir 후브entity .t으 ξ뇨르

。r여 anizations 호뇨르Y.!:르르L후Z르·

Thus , institutions rea1ize a variety of organizations
particu1a :t:

ki끄역

으￡ 르

(with the same identity) which through unopposed

pattern of interaction among members estab1ish themse1ves as
1egitimate in a particu1ar domain and in turn genera1ize
themse1ves into or re-store (support or modify) the very
institution that gave rise to it.

According1y , institutions

consist of know-how , have information , can be considered as
be10nging to a noosphere , and are communicab1e through
experiences , by examp1es , in the form of stories or by written
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messages (law). In contrast , the actual interactions among
individuals that constitute a particular

or덩 anization

belong

t。

an ecosphere , occupy physical space and take place in a medium.
The processes that go on between the two are processes of
continuous co-production or genesis in the face of perturbations
from the medium in which these processes take place.
Institutions also specify

Q。 ndition ê. i.으.:r !!\embershi]2，

the

rationalitv applicablg within its domain and the already
mentioned

organizational_후뎌ent후1Y.

particularly important here.

The rationality dimension is

It defines legitimate means , ends

and optimizing procedures which may differ radically in different
institutions (compare the cognized purposes of a family , a
business enterprise , a church and a municipal government).
Eleanor Rosh (1978) would probably say here that
institutions are

Q으gn후t후ve 。 rototvoe ê.

against which the

typicality of a particular organization (its deviations from an
"ideal" reference point) is judged and its identity is
established.

The regulative principles that define an

institution do not imply organizational hierarchies , however.
。 nly

the accomplishment of recurrent coordination of behavior

among members matter.

Institutions are also not super-individual

entities or centrally issued rules and regulations (even though
legal authority may enforce some of them).

Institutions are

located in individuals ’ cognition and interactions and
distributed 르객으n.g h브겐효.!l

]2 articipant ê.

in 。 rqanizationalN으므트흐 se흐·

23

without human participation neither social institutions nor
social organizations can exist.
In sociology there is a tradition of distinguishing among
institutional spheres , for example , the sphere of family and
kinship , the economic sphere of industry , commerce and business ,
the political sphere of

g。、rernment

and the sphere of cultural ,

educational and religious activities.

These spheres are formed

by sociologists putting a great number of organizations , thought
to have something in common , into one category and then studying
the transactions between these aggregates.

This analytical

practice has little to do with my preceding distinction which is
grounded in participant experiences and informed by
anthropological notions of institution , their expression in
language and cognition , and intended to shed light on
communication processes for which these objectifies sociological
categories leave little room.
s 。 cial

oraanization

In contrast to institutions , social organizations are real ,
involve an infrastructure of people , artifacts , communications ,
and operate in a medium of available resources including
potential members and other organizations they may interact with
and thrive on.

Organizations may grow in size (by whichever

measure) stay where they are or even perish , but always are in
the process of realizing and re-storing the potential inherent in
the institution to which they thereby belong and may do this
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sequentially or concurrently involving same or different
individuals.

The same group of individuals could êeauentiallv

constitute themselves as a town meeting , as a country fair or as
a religious congregation by each taking different roles.

A

particular institution also could give birth to a whole
n。nulati 。n 으i Q。ncurrent

oraanizationê , each involving different

individuals at any one time as in advertising agencies , film
producers or families.

It is also common for individuals to move

through an organization without affecting it , through employee
turnover , for example , or joint memberships as when members of
。 ne

organization sit on the board of another.

There is more

fluidity in social organizations than we commonly think.
context , social

In this

。 raanizationS 효프르 겐으 re I?흐tt르ζne역 m;:으으르흐흐르흐 E뇨효ξ

피<lY9.르으으겐E으흐르 르nd 1::eassemble
효후 ff르흐르nt Il.l효으르흐

themselves

효호 흐 iffeζ르nt 호후잭르흐 후E

with institutions being the medium through which

the reproduction and dissemination of coordination of human
interaction takes place.

The diagram in Figure 3 applies here as

well.
I have to say here that I am not a functionalist

wh。

believes that all social organizations are designed to pursue a
particular goal , require consensus among members as to their
purpose , must be organized in a hierarchical fashion or that all
individual acts could or should be analyzed in view of the
contribution they make to the maintenance (function) or weakening
(dysfunction) of the whole.

There are some organizations that

are designed with some purpose in mind , but

m으흐후 j브흐호 뇨효~t 。
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exist by projecting the sequence of their past realizations

int 。

In fact , when asked , most managers in charge of

their future.

large organizations are unable to state their organization ’ s aims
exhaustively and think about goals only in response to particular
crises.

That social organizations can preserve their identity in

the face of changing membership or change their identity under
preservation of their membership makes it misleading to compare
them with biological organisms whose components , while
replaceable , cannot help but stay

t。연 ether

as long as they live.

However , it is safe to state three propositions.
social organization can exist for long unless it
브르E르 fit흐

;f으흐 narticipati 。n

n。

deζiv르흐 효흐르g묘르t트

from interacting with its medium (environment)

distributes these as incentive ê.

First ,

,

to its members ,

and simultaneously maintains , improves or expands its
infrastructure , relying on internally acceptable principles of
rationality for this distribution.
。 rganization

leoitimate

Second , no social

can exist for long unless it can

후흐르끄tity

IIξ르흐르 rve 효

vis-a-vis other organizations , recruiting

qualified members and socializing them into its own
。 rganizational

culture.

This means supporting , expanding ,

defending against threats to legitimacy the very institution that
infuses "life" and encourages and coordinates the interaction
among members constituting the organization.
。 rganization

Finally , no social

can exist for long unless it can observe the

(manifest , and according to its own principles of rationality ,
self-serving) consequences of its own actions on its environment.
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Thus the network of interactions constituting an organization
must contain loops , however complex they may be , i.e.
m;:으으g흐등으프

,

ζ르드브ζE후X르

involving its medium or environment , through which

。 raanizati 。n 으르끄 흐르르 후흐self.

효E

This circularity has elsewhere been

called operational closure (Varela , 1984)

,

informational closure

(Ashby , 1956) and probably is the most important organizational
unit of analysis proposed here.
To elaborate briefly , when A causes B , B causes C and C
causes A , then A , B and C are said to be involved in a circular
causality.

A circle has no beginning and no end.

t。

Seeking

explain A , for example , requires one to go first to C than to B
and back to A which was to be explained.

Thus each participant

in a circle ultimately explains itself via others and the whole
resists manipulation from the outside.

Similarly , when the

communication paths through an organization lead to behaviors in
an environment whose consequences are seen or fed back into the
very communication paths that led to them , the circle is closed
。r

open only to perturbations from its environment.

。 raanization ê. expl효후n

.:themselves or

c 。 nstitute

circularitV 으i th르후E 으쁘nQ。mmunicati 。D ]2.효t끄ê..
inside mark 효E 。 raanization ’ s 르브t으낀으핀y.

Thus , social

themselves

후n

the

Decisions made

1 hasten to add that my

concept of information does not imply causality and the
circularity that constitutes a social (as opposed to biological)
。 rganization

is a

Q ircularly

(효E효 뇨en으g 젠브뇨브효llY)

트E효뇨L후ng

one.

To take another step towards the framework for institutional
analysis 1 have been promising , let me take ecology as model of
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interaction , one that probab1y is the radica1 opposite of socia1
。 rganization ，

and then 10cate processes invo1ving the mass-media

dynamica11y in between.
Eco1oqv of orqanizations
The idea of eco1ogy comes from bio1ogy where it is defined
르핀으ng 겐르1lY 12。Du1ations 으￡ 흐E으으후르흐

as the interactior1

(not to be

confused with the interaction between two or more organisms or
between one and its environment) and app1ied there 1arge1y
anima1s and p1ants.

t。

As a framework for an institutiona1 ana1ysis

it is attractive for four reasons:
First , popu1ations of

를g르으후트를 L후ve 후ni뇨르후프 으쁘끄

environment

。r

eco1ogica1 niche to which they respond and which they organize

in

호뇨르후효

very

으쁘프

Cateqorieê.

Eco1ogica1 mode1s do not

presuppose that different species share an "understanding" of
each other and see their wor1ds through the same eyes (Uexkue11 ,
1940). Simi1ar1y , there is no need to assume that a business
enterprise , whose members

co11ecti、re1y

conceptua1ize their

environment in terms of products , markets , competitors , financia1
。pportunities

and governmenta1 constraints , construct their wor1d

in the same way as a po1ice department or a church wou1d do.
Each has its own rationa1 princip1es for converting resources
into benefits of their own kind.
rea1ity constructions.

Each has its own categories for

Each 1ives in a virtua11y different wor1d

which does not prevent them from interacting with each other.
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Second , populations of biological
t으gg호뇨트.，;: ξ뇨ζ으묘요hQ으th .Q。moetitior1
c。 ooeratior1

for scarce resources

흐nd

for maintaining a common gene pool without which a

species ceases to exist.
。f

등~으후르흐 흐으르:m.t으 뇨효끄요

Similarly , because social organizations

the same kind are constitutively alike , construct their worlds

in similar categories , thrive on similar resources , including

a

common po01 of qua1ified members and therefore "understand" each
。ther

better than any other species of organizations can , they

natura11y compete among themse1ves.

However , from an ec010gica1

perspective , it does not rea11y matter which particu1ar
。 rganization

of a species does survive and how , as 10ng as a

sufficient number of such organizations continuous1y reproduce
themse1ves and re-store their institution (or institutiona1
sphere) either by their own recurrent behavior or by joint1y
supporting other organizations (e.g. for professiona1 education ,
research or lobbying) that wi11.
Third , 르드으L으요후르를 ev으 1v르 흐t르뇨 1e .,;:e1ationshios 뇨르t꼬르르E
.êL2르으후르Ê.

To interact , different species need not know each other

and often are categorica11y incapab1e of doing so except through
the consequences of their own actions.

From the perspective of

an outside observer , recurrent actions and perceived consequences
form comp1ex and increasing1y stab1e networks consisting of
cooperative , competitive , symbiotic or parasitic re1ationship
chains that simp1y emerge or are metaphorica11y speaking
"negotiated" without outside intervention.
recognizes no outsider , on1y participants).

(In fact an ec010gy
Ec010gies are
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neither designed by a sing1e species nor do they require a
centra1 ru1er or authority to function.

An eco1ogy is not

democratic , ega1itarian or just but responsive to every connected
popu1ation of species.

(A bio1ogica1 eco1ogy is a1so responsive

to the human species , of course , but because we can neither
understand other species we11 nor interact with them
Ireasonab1y ," even though we continuous1y try , we experience our
eco1ogy as rather unru1y and certain1y unmanageab1e).

An eco1ogy

is a radica11y heterarchica1 and distributed system.
Fourth , gco1oaica1
흐으잭트

흐yst르팍흐

seek ba1ance or

으으nv르1:9:르 호으쁘효E효흐

eaui1ibriunat which popu1ations keep each other in check ,

continuous1y check and maintain an optimum variety of species ,
and assure the most efficient use of 1imited resources.

Gregory

Bateson (1972) is one of many who described such an equi1ibrating
tendency as 9istributed

쁘후등역으ID.

But , whereas the gene poo1s of

different bio1ogica1 species are sexua11y incompatib1e , in the
noosphere , the institutions of different species of organizations
are rare1y so distinct and 1aissez-faire under conditions of a
coherent and purposive1y created noosphere can become
patho1ogica1 as Bateson pointed out (1972 , 1987) or co11ective1y
disadvantageous (Hardin , 1968).
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Mass-media ecoloqv
Let me now sketch with Figure 4 an extremely simplified and
selective account of an ecology that includes such species of
。 rganizations

as the mass communications industry and the public

as constitutive parts , mass-media ecology for short.

Figure 4

The figure clearly does not do justice to the ecological
complexities we know of.

For example , the communications

industry comprises stations , networks , wire services ,
journalists , production studios , not to forget the technological
infrastructure around which it grew , a complex webb all by
itself.

The figure also excludes financial organizations , civic

action groups , universities that do in fact participate. People
also have multiple organizational memberships and flow through
this

ecol 。당y

as well.

Nevertheless it serves the purpose of the

argument and includes some of Figure 1 for it is the role of
communication research I will end this paper with.
In this figure , one may see several circles.

The money flow

from the public to the market to industrial production and back
in the form of compensation for work , regulates the consumption
。f

goods , services and energy by the public.

Money naturally

flows in a direction opposite the flows of matter and energy.
Several circles involve advertising and marketing in various
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As the industry ’ s eye on the market , advertising and

capacities.

marketing is imp1icated in optimizing the f10w of goods and
services.

As the arm of industria1 production it creates c

advertisements and financia11y supports mass communication which
in turn de1ivers favourab1e markets.

One may a1so observe that

the money that pays for the communications industry ’ s behavior in
the pub1ic domain comes via advertising , via industria1
production , sa1es and consumption of goods and services and
u1timate1y from the pub1ic ’ s earnings for contributing productive
As George Gerbner (1977a) noted , this is a heavy tax paid

work.

by the pub1ic for entertainment be1ieved to be free of charge.
But the most important circ1e invo1ves a11 five species of
。 rganizations.

Arrows in Figure 4 do not represent causes but information
f1ows.

They therefore do not depict what (mu1ti-causa11y ,

conditiona11y , probabi1istica11y or structura11y) "determines"
the occurrence of an event but the f10w of
1ogica1

worlζ

~르tter낀흐 호뇨at

enab1르

(computation or decision making) or organizationa1

work (regu1ation , coordination of interaction) to be performed.
The circu1arities in which the mass-media are imp1icated are
르E흐뇨 1ing

Q ircu1aritieg:

one pattern enab1es its receiver

t。

create another pattern that enab1es some other receiver ... and
the who1e chain u1timate1y proves itse1f as a viab1e pattern
a11 participants within the circ1e.

The circu1ar enab1ement may

u1timate1y become a recurrent process that reinforces its own
practice.

t。
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In this ecology , money is not seen as causing anything
either.

Money does not provide know-how by itself. It is an

(economic) enabler in its purest form but useful only in
conjunction with specific know-how from elsewhere.
。f

In an ecology

social organizations money becomes a co-driver of the

informational enabling process.
Note also the role of perturbations in a mass-media ecology.
Events may enter from the outside and are capable of introducing
unexpected variations , disturbances or "news."

Such

perturbations may reverberate throughout an ecology , are
systematically transformed in passing or rejected already at the
entry point.

Traditionally , and with a journalistic perspective

and linear communication conceptions in mind , one may confuse
such perturbations with the content of communication , with what
news is expected to bring to public attention.

My point is that

within a mass-media ecology the information communicated
throughout an ecological network , including as messages , goods
services , money and interorganizational exchanges and agreements ,
pertains first of all to its own circular enabling processes.

It

is invented largely within these processes and supports or will
at least not work against the continuous reproduction of the
network , connecting a great many organizations as participants at
different points in their processes , each for their own benefits.
Only secondarily may the circularities be seen as perturbed by
。utside

events.

If they are , information about events is always

systematically transformed , incorporated and assimilated

int。
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internally communicable pattern.

All conventions from linguistic

representations to journalistic practices exemplify such
systematic transformations which outsiders who can claim
privileged access to its causes may consider biased but insiders
consider established facts.

Only if information from the outside

resists such transformations may it become a true disturbance.
Traditional preferences for linear causal explanations initiated
by outside events and the belief in a correspondence conception
。f

truth are thus necessarily partial , and if the flow of

information in society is circular , goes back to where it
started , describing the one-way flow of outside events to a
public and stopping there is seriously misleading.

As a unit of

analysis , a linear causal chain would remove from understanding
the very institutionaljorganizational phenomena that make this
flow possible.
Note again that a mass-media ecology as presented here has
no designated controller.

It regulates itself through its

network of interaction , establishes itself through the
participation of each species of organizations , including those
marked " regulatory" agencies which thrive on public information ,
perhaps as provided by communication researchers , and participate
in the process by constraining perceived excesses.

T。

recognizably conserve itself , each species of organizations needs
to continually realize its own institution but does not require
anything beyond a "myopic" view of the species it interacts with
。r

"sees." This is true also for traditional communication
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researchers who can pursue their own communication model without
a conception of the ecology of which they are a part.

The self-

regulation of the circular enabling process is such an ecology ’ s
most outstanding feature.
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A Cvbernetics of Mass-Media Ecoloqv
cybernetics originated in the 1940 ’ s when a series of
interdisciplinary conferences culminated in a better
understanding of circular causal feedback mechanisms , later
called cybernetics , the science of control and communication
(Wiener , 1948).

It offered a new approach to understanding

purpose , not as an unanalyzable quality of living beings ,
not by reference to a vital substance or divine force , for
example , but as a consequence of the way a system is put
together and behaves.
흐르뇨르X후으ζ ，

predicts

Cybernetic teleology

expl효후E흐 。r

whether it is geared to achieve a goal ,

maintains an equilibrium , systematically grow in some
variable or appears entirely random.
referen으르 호으 t뇨르 E르ζ꼬으rk 으i

behavior.

It does

interactior1

s。

뇨X

underlying this

Historically , structural-behavioral explanations

are not new , but cybernetics also provided the mathematics
and initiated the development of a new kind of machines
pr。、ring

such explanations to be sufficient.

This had

radical consequences initially in technology (development of
automatic control devices , computers , and communication
networks)

, but somewhat slower in the conduct of social

science

[evolutionaryepistemology (Campbell , 1974);

experimental episteology (McCulloch 1974)

, cybernetic

explanations (Bateson , 1972) and radical constructivism
(Glasersfeld , 1984)].
since its inception , cybernetics has witnessed a wealth
。f

conceptual developments , has acquired new definitions and
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given birth to numerous disciplines , but çircularitv
remained one of its pillars.

Circularities are abundantly

present in the mass-media ecology as described , essential

t。

social organizations and built into my notion of information
as the potential for ontogenesis.
pillar.
。f

Pr으드르E흐

is another such

Cyberneticians do not ask what something consists

or is but what it does (Ashby , 1956).

。 rganizations

Thus , while social

are composed of people , the individual

qualities of their members are less important than how they
communicate with each other , the network of enabling
processes in which they

constituti、rely

participate and the

institutions they interactively realize.

In this section I

want to merely sketch three hypotheses of an institutional
approach to the mass-media.

‘

the biologist Tarela (1984)

The first two are derived from

,

the third is characteristic of

social systems.

l끄 르으으L으g후 es 으.f 흐으므호르1 。 rqanizationê.，
흐g으브rS J.ve tu::으으르특흐르흐 으으nv르 rge :t으E흐I효흐 흐I흐뇨L르

realities.

circular processes are describable by recursive
functions whose definition implies that they are repeatedly
entered into their own arguments and compute a chain of
values analogue to going around and around the same circle.
While some recursive functions are explosive (diverge from
any starting point into infinity , like exponential functions
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do)

,

in the non-mathematical world of finite resources ,

infinity does not exist and organizations that are
constituted with explosive circularities "blow themselves
up" , do not persist for long and become rare.

Therefore , it

is no surprise that most recursive processes that are indeed
。bserved

are converging (like the square root function or

divisions by numbers greater than one)

,

even in the face of

perturbations from the medium in which they are embodied.
The behavior towards which a recursively describable process
converges is called its
。peration ，

g후 gen-섣g뇨흐X후으~

(eigen-value , eigen-

etc.) which is characterized by regularity , the

absence of differences or invariances under continuous
perturbations.

Recursive processes can be said to regulate

themselves with goals and values implicit in the network of
interaction underlying this behavior.

1 will give an

example before coming to the main interpretation of this
hypothesis.
If a farmer repeatedly plants the seeds from her
highest yielding crop , the evolving strands will increase
their yield until they reach a plateau at which continued
selection is necessary to maintain but will then no longer
improve that yield.

At this point the recursive operation

(of selecting seeds from the highest yielding crop) and its
product (crop yielded) go hand in glove , one defines the
。 ther ，

and constitutes an eigen-behavior.

The farmer may be

fully aware of the self-imposed recursion and desire the
ultimate outcome even though the continued effort without
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further improvement may end up being an unanticipated
Burden or not , the farmer ’ s recurrent operation and

burden.

the yield constitute that farmer ’ s stable , interactively
predictable and structurally determinable reality ,
regardless of where the process may have come from.
In an ecology , a comparable awareness of its
circularities is not required for convergence to take place.
In the mass-media ecology of Figure 4 , advertisers will
certainly know who their clients are and respond to them but
may not care about the other participants ’ modes of
Manufacturers tend to know their markets ,

。 peration.

appreciate the value of advertising and bring the

tw。

together but do not need to be aware of the latent
consequences of advertising in order to reap their
institutionally defined harvests from establishing the
connection.

The communication industry knows where the

money comes from and the audiences it has to deliver in
return but does not need to go much beyond this
understanding , etc.
。ptimizes

If each species of organizations just

its own benefits by its very own institutional

criteria and repeatedly applies the same operations on the
。pportunities
。verall

available information offers to them , the

recursive process carried out by these

or덩 anizations

are likely to converge to an eigen-behavior at which the
realities of each and every participant in the circle
appears coordinated and reasonably stable , interactively
predictable and manageable within individual spheres of
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interest.

It is the circular enablement within an ecology ,

not an overall system awareness , plus the individual
institutions that regulate organizational behavior which
gives the whole a certain direction , a structural purpose
and the implicit goal of constructing mutually coordinated
realities.
Reality constructions need not be individually created
images , models or things , however , but viable ontogeneticepigenetic
흐E흐g르펴

l2.ζ으드르E흐르흐 뇨르호ween 효 E으으.êl2.뇨르E트 르nd 효n ec으.êl2.뇨ere ，

throuqhout

효n~coloqica1 neξE으rk 으t. .Q。mmunicatior1.

If the repeated realization and re-storing of information is
circularly enabling , then this process creates or
constitutes realities that do not depict or represent
anything outside that process.

For example , most genres on

television , talk shows , soap operas , quizzes , crime series ,
westerns , etc. did not exist before radio.

They should be

regarded as "negotiated" inventions that satisfy numerous
。 rganizational

interests , whether for regular production

schedules , advertising breaks , predictable programing ,
political interests , ethnic representations , civic concerns ,
with realities thus increasingly fixed , TV networks ,

etc.

newspapers and radio stations may change hands but do not
change the service to their audience members.
This convergence hypothesis has been largely
substantiated on the level of individual communication
(Kincaid , 1979)
1975)

,

,

mass communication (Kincaid and Schramm ,

in social organizations (Rogers and Kincaid , 1981)
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and is an underlying assumption in George Gerbner ’ s
cultivation research except that cybernetics provides
structural explanation of this behavior.

The idea of a

collective communication theory with multiple participants
and no single source of control has most recently been
developed by Wickenden (1988).

E드으L으요후으프 으i 흐으으후효1. 。 rqanizations 으낀흐nge
!lY n효호브互효1. dr후흐.t'!!.뇨 ile2reservin<1 호h르후E

recursivities.

As above said , recursive processes develop "a life of
their own" whose realities are somewhat resistant to control
efforts from the outside and can therefore be said to be
self-nreserving.

But what is preserved here is not a

particular realization or everything that happens to be part
。f

the resulting reality but its

coherence.

g끄흐뇨 ling f!. ircularitie ê.,

its

When A enables B enables C enables A , all three

may commit themselves to continue to relate to each other

s。

as to preserve the process of mutual enablement but not
necessarily its physical manifestations.

Indeed , in an

ecology of social organization there is a constant turnover
。f

components (of people , organizations and artifacts). Each

such change introduces changes in its material composition ,
form and membership without affecting the (individually
experienced) process of mutual enablement.

The hypothesis

suggests that recursivity under perturbation may send an
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ecology adrift and that this drift is neither structurally
determined nor purposive from within.
A new technology may radically alter the operation of
。ne

。f

species of organizations and drive another species out
existence , but tends to modify only the medium in which

circularities persist.

certain management practices may

ruin one advertising agency but another typically already
waits to expand into its place.

Unsuccessful organizational

practices may drop out of circulation in such drifts and may
temporarily increase a system ’ s

。、rerall

efficiency , but this

implies little if anything about long term gains.

Events

intruding from the outside , new laws , unexpected economic
conditions , social revolutions , etc. may force evolutionary
changes in other variables of a system , cause the whole

t。

adapt , drift into new territories but rarely do they destroy
the underlying recursivities.
narticinants

딛nle흐르 ξ효g 꾀효i으ζ후.ty 으1:
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This

the 쁘뇨으L르 E으으브I등후ve p.흐으으g흐흐 샌르투르lv

drift is "natural" in the sense that its

causes can not easily if at all be comprehended from within
the reality constructions that a recursivity entails , and
rarely is noticed as such.
The idea that recursive communication processes resist
。utside

influences conflicts particularly with the

traditional journalistic ideal of truthful (in the sense of
。bjective ，

value-free and observer-independently verifiable)
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reporting.

We are made to believe that news is new , caused

by unanticipated outside events of social significance and
is to be completely and accurately

c。、rered

by the media , and

yet , we know too well that true surprises are personally
difficult to understand and have hard times entering the
self-supporting circular flows of information throughout
。 rganizations.

Unless they can be phrased in familiar

terms , seen as furthering cognized interests , or infringe
。 nly

on the weakest or most dispensable components involved

in a network , they are likely to be ignored.

witness the

practice of defining what is newsworthy and what is not , the
planning of news events or news conferences , or the mere
adaptation of traditional themes , myths , stories , editorial
formulae to contemporary circumstances , using ancient
metaphors to render the incomprehensible understandable at
least as far as tradition allows it.
Information in circuit first of all affects itself and
thereby becomes constituted as real during repeated
recursions.

The unfolding of the history of mass-media

content thus facilitates internal structural purposes.

Only

secondarily does a mass-media ecology drift , elaborate
missing details , adapt to new circumstances , evolve or
incorporate unignorable
information.

、rariation

into the flow of

What accumulates in response to perturbations

is information whose survival value is not knowable from
within , hence the "natural" drift.
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E브브L추드 c。mmunicati 。!l，

(the ecology)

후!l :t뇨g ru;:르흐르E으르 으.f

호뇨브등 transforminσ

it흐르 lf

후끄보으 효끄 inteqrateg .ê.요흐호 em 으.f 후 ts

딛쁘!l.

As a model , an ecology accounts for interaction among
populations of species that need not understand each other.
No single controlling agency is required.
picture of the whole.

1nstitutionalizati 。 n

None has a
is a process

where accidentally arisen or consciously initiated
。 rganizational

pattern become transformed into communicable ,

legitimized and regularized institutions capable of
realizing networks of interaction similar to those that gave
rise to it.

Institutionalization is self-organization in

the social domain.

It is also a form of convergence that

takes place in the noosphere in which language and human
communication play decisive roles.

Through

institutionalization , the radically distributed nature of a
social ecology erodes into an integrated social system , with
regulative principles of its own , a social organization
composed of different species of social organizations.
Thus , in the social domain an ecology is a mere transitional
phenomenon.
One source of institutionalization lies in the
advantage .ê. tandardized interface .ê. offer to participants.

T。
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interact efficiently , manufacturing industry took the path
。f

agreeing on norms for types , alphabets , frequencies ,

connections.

The communications industry evolved program

schedules , as printed in

및뜨으브후다g ，

and a vocabulary by which

audience members can talk to each other , make appropriate
choices and express their preferences through surveys and
interviews.

Promotional agents connect talents with

production studios by established categories.

Lawyers

promote the kind of distrust that enables them to provide
and argue the validity of legally enforceable contracts ,
thus placing an interfacing institution in between.
Multiple memberships on the boards of directors of
supposedly independent industries are still another form of
institutional integration through the regulation of
interfaces.
Probably the most important source of
institutionalization is the very information the mass-media
provides to the public.

The public does not merely

participate as a component in the mass-media ecology of
Figure 4 , it also is the pool from which virtually all
members of the other organizations are drawn and public
information therefore penetrates the institutional spheres
。f

nearly all participating organizations.

Since Harold

Lassell ’ s proposal for a list of functions of communication
in society is "the correlation of the components of society"
(1948) recognized as such.

George Gerbner says much the

same when he proposed to look at mass communication in terms
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。f

"what is related to what" (1969a).

Indeed , it is only

through some form of public communication that people can
achieve an awareness of the system as a whole an overview of
how the diverse constituents of a society hang together , by
which principles the interaction intermittently existing
social organizations are regulated , what options for social
participation do exist , etc.

However , the mass-media are

not the only source of institutionalization.

Others ,

regulatory agencies in government , expansionist business
corporations , but also
g으겐E르토g

â으으후효1. :t뇨g으ri트5 으i

!nass-communication

with each other for providing legitimate accounts of

how society operates and by which system principles it is
be understood and seen as regulated.

As George once added

to his analysis of (mass or public) "communication:
is the Message" (1974).

t。

Society

1 would emphasize that such

accounts not merely describe what

후흐，

they also make society

happening.
In the competition for determining the direction
institutionalization may take , those organizations most
。bservant

of the whole , most directly connected with the

pUblic or most authoritatively involved with a system are
likely to institute their own principles of regulation
before others can.

Indeed , since "surveys" of mass-media ’ s

fictional populations have been made (e.g. Loewenthal , 1944;
Berelson & Salter , 1946)

,

such populations have been shown

to be heavily skewed towards entertainers , actors , popular
heroes , celebrities and other ethnic favorites who are
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largely "made" by and representative of the mass-media and
whose social role models assure these media a continuous
supply of talent , popularity and large audiences.

Moreover ,

the mass-media promote a show business ethic which underlies
their very own rationality whose penetration into other
institutional spheres (for example the politics of
elections , sports , even war) makes the mass-media a dominant
institution and creates a social system that hides the
circularities on which the mass-media are actually
。 rganized.

。n

the other hand , social scientific theories of the

structure of mass-media systems , which carry the weight of
scientific validity in a manner to be described below ,

d。

compete with popular notions and those serving institutional
interests and direct institutionalization as well.

It is

the willingness of communication researchers to become
engaged in this "struggle" for institutionalization that
makes communication theories socially relevant.
The last but perhaps the most important consequence of
institutionalization to be mentioned here lies in limiting
the variety of cognitive models accessible to people for
。 rganizing

their own lives.

A mass-media system by its own

practice , selectively reproduces itself and elaborates
primarily those parts of the noosphere that are beneficial
。r

at least not harmful to the operation of that system and

。 rganizes

the noosphere around the very regulative

principles that legitimize its own organization.

In the
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extreme case , this amounts to supporting cognitive traps for
individuals that serve to perpetuate the mass-media system
as instituted and prevents individuals from taking different
perspectives.

This is accomplished not by the exercise of

force , not even by deliberate elimination of options but by
。verwhelming

the public with choices that are

institutionally irrelevant:

choices among similar

entertainment programs , choices among competitive (and hence
alike) consumer products , choices among political candidates
thatwill do much the same , choices among answers to survey
questions that are neither binding anyone nor threatening
existing institutions.

(In the sociology of knowledge , such

limitations are associated with a dominant

후흐g으L으요y.

Here 1

do not presume a noosphere to be so consistent and am more
concerned with the dynamic its variety implies).
A cognitive trap prevents individuals from shifting

t。

larger perspectives , from seeing their world or themselves
with different eyes , particularly when faced with apparently
meaningless tasks , perplexing situations , or feeling of
alienation or helplessness.

Social scientists are not

exempt from such entrapments.

The seemingly endless

repetition of research into manipulative notions of
communication and attitude change , for example , requiring
momentous efforts for only small gains in predictability
might serve as an example.
this to be

호뇨g 으낀lY.

The trap results from believing

notion of communication meaningfully

researchable without realizing that this very notion

als。
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provides both the economic basis for the communications
industry and the conceptual framework for creating popular
entertainment to which social scientists are subjected as
well.
Although the cybernetic framework sketched in the
foregoing does explain processes that are essentially
indigenous to a system , it involves scientific observers
(me) as outsiders.
。bservation ，

When detached from their object of

scientist are likely to see themselves either

as superior beings , capable of an understanding the observed
people are not , or as cynics who nobody listens to for their
taking of alien perspectives.

The two positions entail

constructing people either as trivial machines with

n。

creative capability of their own (Krippendorff , 1986) or as
pathetic creatures unable to help themselves and doomed
be controlled by others , e.g. by "the system."

t。

1 believe

this is the necessary consequence of an epistemology that
forbids observing scientists to enter their domain of
。 bservation

。bjectively ，

and expects them to describe reality
that is , without awareness of their own

creative role in this process.

The next and final section

seeks to transcend this outsider perspective on mass-media
systems and develop a more responsible position.
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A Cvbernetics of Cvbernetics for Communication Research
Ever since Margaret Mead suggested that cybernetics
app1y its know1edge to what cyberneticians do (1968) has
cybernetic epistemo1ogy become an increasing1y fascinating
venture (e.g. Bateson , 1972; Foerster , 1974 , 1979; Howe ,
1975; Maturana

&

‘lare1a ,

1984; Sega1 , 1986).

1980; Keeney , 1983; Krippendorff ,

I am suggesting this auto1ogy (the

app1ication of know1edge onto itse1f (Lofgren , 1984))
app1ies to communication research as we11.

Communication

researchers cannot but practice what they study , i.e.

,

they

need to communicate their theories of communication. The
app1ication of insights , princip1es and concepts of
communication to how communication researchers come to their
theories and communicate them to others , inc1uding to the
peop1e about whom these theories speak , is , I am convinced ,
epistemo1ogica11y revo1utionary here as we11.
I take it to be obvious that socia1 theories of
communication are different from theories of how signa1s are
transmitted between machines in that they constitutive1y
invo1ve peop1e capab1e of 1earning from them.

As human

individua1s , we are not on1y the ones who make them up but
respond to them as we11.
。f

Such responses may take the form

conscious1y accepting and app1ying them to our 1ives , but

a1so of active1y opposing them in pUb1ic discourse ,
de1iberate1y vio1ating them , for instance , when they make us
rea1ize to what we have been conforming before.

We a1so can
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invent new or better theories and make them true in new
kinds of practices.
are no

lon연 er

Under these conditions social theories

either simply true or not.

Their "truth"

depends on acceptance , practice and consent and those
proposing such theories through their very publication
cannot escape participating in the process they may thereby
set in motion.
That even data easily become invalidated by

enterin당

the stream of public communications is easily demonstrated.
Earlier publications of content analysis statistics on
racial bias in magazine advertisement and TV fiction in
terms of frequencies of kinds of characters has made the
population of the television characters a more fair
representation of the population of viewers but shifted
racial biases , where prejudices persisted , to not yet or
principally immeasurable areas of expression.

Feminist

attention to male dominant language use , whether through
pronoun construction , hidden presuppositions or
stereotypical expressions , has increased linguistic
awareness , modified sexual references in public discourse ,
created a new literature and area of research and
significantly altered inter-gender communication.
。f

Theories

the emerging information society have construed

information as a commodity and significantly altered the way
corporations measure and account for their information
processes and economy of intelligence.

Making a big jump ,

both in scale and in time , Karl Marx ’ theories of class
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strugg1e as the fundamenta1 basis for societa1 deve10pment
has become an unquestioned rea1ity for revo1utionary
m 。、rements

and the societies that emerged from them but

d。

not work at a11 in the capita1ist West where peop1e took his
predictions to heart , opposed the theories in pub1ic and in
action and deve10ped another society instead.
George Gerbner is of course aware of the potentia11y
se1f-va1idating consequences of te1evision content.

One of

the hypotheses he advanced is that heavy viewers of
te1evision vio1ence deve10p exaggerated expectations of
vio1ence outside their home and are 1ess 1ike1y to go out on
the street at 1ate hours , thus inviting crimina1 e1ements
ru1e the streets unchecked.

t。

That te1evision stories become

truer as they are watched , particu1ar1y in the "main stream"
。f

the f10w of mass produced messages is guiding much of

George ’ s cu1tivation research and is a1so quite consistent
with the cybernetic theories that stab1e rea1ities come
being by recursive networks of communication.

int 。

George was

featured frequent1y on te1evision , testified in the U.S.
Congress , wrote numerous artic1es in popular magazines like
in

및뜨흐팍흐르 1 요뽀브L효1;:1:svcholoay ，

business and re1igious newspapers.
also widely cited.

ß. cientifi Q I1파르닫으쁘

and

His TV vio1ence data are

His "message" certainly has been

inserted into the noosphere , has been publicly discussed and
has become part of the very television content it is
concerned with.
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And yet , I do not think his theories take account of
the "institutiona1 truth" they might be creating by their
very pub1ication (and George promoting them).
invo1ved in a "War against Vio1ence" (1977c)

,

Being
he certain1y

wou1dn ’ t 1ike to bring about the scary wor1d of te1evision
he describes , or see that te1evision rep1ace re1igion.
Sure1y , he must be painting
provocative.
。bjecti、re1y

these scary images to be

But then , any criticism that mere1y uncovers ,
describes and scientifica11y predicts the

"terrib1e things the mass-media actua11y dO ," must first1y
be accepted as authoritative accounts of
fact.

띤뇨효.t 후.ê. q으 ing 으n

in

Numerica1 backups p1ay their symbo1ic ro1e in

suggesting their undesirab1e truth.

This becomes second1y

disab1ing , for scientific predications cannot be a1tered at
wi11 without denying their va1idity in the first p1ace.
Such criticism is thus unab1e to serve as a ground for
intervention , at worst reinforces or 1egitimizes the very
practice it ca11s to question and at best initiates a search
for convenient scapegoats or remedies from outside the
system.

Criticism that wou1d account of the institutiona1

truths must create viab1e futures.
Moreover , George himse1f is 1iving proof of a
creativity and imagination that his communication theories
deny those who watch te1evision , maybe just as much as he
does:

Whereas , he expects audiences to become

"mainstreamed" by the massive presence of industria11y
produced messages , he himse1f has become more--not 1ess--
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critical the longer he is exposed to this medium , etc.

I am

suggesting that the unavailability of institutional analyses
。f

the mass-media which George lamented may be explained not

so much by the lack of adequate funding but by the
epistemological difficulties traditional researchers
experience in making their analyses applicable to their own
practice , having to include themselves.
The foregoing leads me to three stipulations , jointly
amounting to the position of a new criterion for the
validity of social theories of communication , here applied
to the analysis of mass-media systems and institutions.
They read as follows:

First:

및뇨g으￡후르E 으i

효E효 투르흐L후 ze .t뇨eir

mass-media

own

흐X흐te꾀프 핀브흐.t 섣르 c 。mmunicable

。 ntoaenesis 표후t뇨후E 후 he

very

흐요를호르ill

호뇨~ 드L효 im .t으 효묘득으흐후브르·

It recognizes that acts of communication are acts of
bringing forth or changing the phenomena they describe and
demands this to be recognized also for acts of communicating
theories of communication.

It specifically stipulates that

said theories be realizable , result in viable communication
practices and reproduce these practices , perhaps in other
systems as well. Of course , the most obvious media to which
such theories must be applicable is an existing mass-media
system it may redirect or thereby transform.

The

stipulation simply considers theories as information with

events

1

advert1s1ng

manufacturing

/\
.-J \ ‘ -

market

Traditional
Communications Research
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perturbations

perturbations

Cybernetics of
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Cybernetics of Cybernetics
for Communication Research
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。 ntogenetic

capabilities of their own.

It implicitly

rejects the positivistic correspondence notion of truth and
the associated ontological assumption of an observer- and
actor-independent reality that simply "waits" to be
discovered.

It suggests instead that the truths of theories

lies in the process of making the realities such theories
claim they can.

Second:

및뇨.ê. 9。 nstructi 。n 으.f.t뇨르으ri르흐 으.fl!lass-media 등yê.호g겐등

샌브득후 후끄으L브흐르 후뇨르후E 으효g흐t으E흐 효흐

responsible participants.

It holds communication researchers fully accountable
for the effects of their theory constructions and
"findings ," not merely to a scientific community or an
arbitrarily chosen reference group , but to the human
constituents of the very object (organization , network of
communication or system) their theory describes , informs or
may bring about.

Theories are inventions and born in

freedom but also entail participation and taking
responsibilities for their consequences.

It incidentally

responds to feminist criticism of the typically male
construction of
。bjective ，

"disembodied knowledge ," which is rational ,

emotionally detached without reference to the

knower (Belenky , et al.

,

1986).

Participation and

responsibility implies that a theory not only works but
embody their creators.

als 。
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Third:

및뇨르 으re효t으ζ흐
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c 。 nstructirill1뇨em 효nd 브르 쁘 ill 후E요 t흐 1.후ve 후n the v르u
re효 li호후르흐 후뇨르후ζ 호he으E혹으흐 으으브 ld 뇨E후ng ab으브1.

This ethical stipulation is intended to prevent
。ppression

resulting from the acceptance of theories that

describe people in less than human terms and that could
force people to be treated or become that way in practice.
The first stipulation speaks of theories as being realizable
(a theory that yields nothing , enables no one , simply is
socially irrelevant).

The second speaks of the

participation and responsibilities of their creators.
circumventing the difficulty of spelling out the human
qualities that must not be retarded by mass-media theory
constructions and research , this third stipulation
guarantees all human constituents of a system under analysis
the same cognitive competence , freedom and responsibility
the second attributes to the analysts of systems shaped
thereby.
The form of such self-reflective theories is different
from traditional forms.

Theories that include their

creators must be constructed within their very own object
and the process of constructing such theories also as a
process of reconstructing the object while it is described
(Krippendorff , 1984).

Figure 5 , which schematizes Figure 4 ,
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compares the domains of the three approaches to theory
construction 1 have been discussing graphically.

Figure 5

Before

relatin영

these epistemological concerns to key

concepts in the institutional analysis of mass-media systems
and institutions , 1 might add that the proposed stipulations
derive in part from previous work (Krippendorff , 1989) whose
full implications can not be elaborated here.

Moreover , 1

am also applying these to my own involvement in a very
different domain , that of industrial design and development
。f

future communication technology , where new ideas have

both technical and social consequences , not unlike those of
interest here.

Although design is always

intended to be creative of reality , more so than scientific
theories are believed to be , taking responsibility for the
reality either activity brings forth is largely neglected in
both domains.
The framework sketched so far already reflects the
cybernetic epistemology 1 ended up with here:

it enables

looking at social organizations as communication networks
that change as they are described.

It enables social

researchers to responsibly participate in what is
essentially their own affairs and it requires looking at
institutions by being "kind" to their constituents , not
denying them the cognitive abilities communication
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researchers do claim for themselves.

In the following

contrasts 1 will merely show why these analytical concepts
were chosen in preference to traditional ones.
Informati 。n y르rs브흐 E딩쁘er.

In social science discourse

and even in ordinary talk about politics and interpersonal
relations , notions of power are rampant.

Power is a

metaphor from physics where it denotes a non-dimensional
quantity that expresses the rate at which energy is exerted
to causally effect mechanical work.
。 ne-way

In physics , power flows

only and is pitched against a measure of the

resistance to change.

Applied to people , the power metaphor

entails that people are either powerful , powerless , or
possess power in degrees and , depending on the rate of
"energy" they have acquired , are able to force others
change.

t。

The use of power metaphors goes back to the early

fascination with mechanisms and engineering at the beginning
。f

this century.

Consistent with his time , Max Weber

defined "power (as) the probability that one actor within a
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his
。wn

will despite resistance , regardless of the basis on

which this probability rests"(1922:152).

Here too , power is

an attribute of individuals or groups on account of their
position , status and personality.
In the social world , 1 am suggesting that power always
resides in a relationshi12

bet쁘een

people and abstracting it

from its base , just to enforce causal explanations , is going
back to mechanistic conceptions which even the "hard"
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sciences have long abandoned.
not resistance , that

In society , it is

후끄X후 te흐 E으wer 호으 g꾀erge.

~ubmissi 。11 ，

The use of

coercive force makes sense only where the consequences of
non-compliance are feared.

Authority is effective only

among those who accept or grant its legitimacy and are
willing to subject themselves to it.

Social influence

primarily occurs where those influenced do indeed benefit
from changes.

1 am suggesting that the use of power

metaphors in social theories and discourse diverts attention
from the complicity by the actors involved , conceals the
relational source of social change , and reifies a
mechanistic reality construction in which the capacity of
the powerful cannot be questioned and the powerless remain
cognitively trapped in continued submission.

Power

metaphors always serve the powerful and describing social
relationships in these terms only amplifies alleged power
differences.

It objectifies power , breeds the power of the

powerful and disables people to get out of such
relationships.

People that become aware of alternative

reality constructions may also become aware of their
entrapments and will then no longer practice what theories
。f

power entail.

The framework 1 propose is intended

t。

encourage the latter.
For this reason , 1 propose that the analysis of social
mass-media systems and institutions be based not on notions
。f

power but on concepts of information as defined.

Information always presupposes options , some freedom of
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choice , can be rejected and its acceptance is predicated on
understanding , in its receiver ’ s very own terms , what it
。perationally

entails and the benefits that can be expected

from adopting the implied practice.

I suppose this is the

way we read scientific books , watch commercials on
television , follow road maps , apply technical instructions
and should consider obeying orders as well.

In social

situations , information can not force anything.

It enables

its receiver to coordinate something not possible otherwise.
within mass-media systems , information may flow through many
paths , whether in the form of entertainment , payments for
services or interorganizational exchanges , but the path most
important here is from that system to communication
researchers and back.

It is through this loop that both the

system and the researchers reorganize themselves and acquire
interdependent identities.
Enablement

y.료E흐브흐 으학펀료L후ty.

Linear causal

explanations link a consequence to its cause , whether this
link is conditional on other circumstances , multiply
determined , probabilistic or merely sufficient.

They

presume relatively trivial mechanisms underlying both the
phenomena and their models , mechanisms that do not involve
recursive processes or internal circularities and can
therefore have no "1ife of their own."

Many communication

theories are basically causal in nature , for example , when a
message is said to cause a receiver to
mind or to respond appropriately.

chan당e

his or her

Notwithstandin연

later
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developrnents , Shannon ’ s landrnark l'1<l thernatical
c。rnrnunicati 。n
。f

및뇨르으흐X 으￡

was originally conceptualized as a statistics

probable causations.

Here , words like rnessage and

cornrnunication rnerely replace the argurnents in a logic of
linear causality.

Circular causalities have overcorne

lirnitations of linearity (although these notions are far
frorn fully explored in cornrnunication research as 1 will
argue below) but do not respond to rny contention that one
can not cause sorneone to think , understand or accept an
argurnent , rnessage or theory.

Hurnan cornrnunication is

different.
1 cannot develop here a rnore appropriate notion of
cornrnunication except to point out that , while interactions
through rnessages always are physically grounded , no doubt ,
causing sensations of sorts , what rnakes them cognitively
relevant is that they enter as perturbations into internally
coherent and intentionally directed cognitive processes and
are interpreted , rnade sense of , or used there in a receivercharacteristic rnanner.

Cornrnunication rnay either disturb and

interfere with intentional processes or , by looking for what
we want to see and ignoring what we have no use knowing ,
facilitate or enable such processes , hence the association
。f

inforrnation with enablernent rather than with causation or

catalysis.
Explanations in terms of enablement no longer focus
attention on initiating conditions , causes or senders but on
relationshio ê. :t뇨르:t K르으으 iv르ζ5 낀흐X르 흐 드h으후으트 in 드으二
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c。 nstructin。 with

credit to "senders" or enablers for aiding

their (structurally defined or asserted) efforts.

1 am

convinced , enabling relationships , or networks of mutual
enabling processes are

t~e

backbone of individual

participation in organizations , the constitutive base of
society , and provide a ground on which mass-media systems
may be understood.

Recursive enabling networks drive

systems larger than their participants and can thus provide
structural explanations for individual , organizational and
eco1ogical behavior.
Particinati 。n ver를브.ê..Q으ntr으~.

1 already stated that

most communication theories are linear and cast into causal
frames.

There is a sender , a message and a receiver.

There

is the communications industry , a message system and its
mass audience , or public , etc.

Linear communication

theories imply instrumentality and control and research
guided by such linear constructions or geared

t。

elaborating , defining and perfecting such communication
theories or generating data on their behalf naturally
supports social control.

This kind of theory and research

is what advertising needs , totalitarian governments require
and various kinds of authorities can thrive on.

It not only

enables those desirous of controlling others but , especially
when so much research , theorizing and scientific authority
is invested in this notion , it retards other forms of
communication as well:

dialogue , healing , altruism and

love , for example , and discourages awareness of the larger
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fabric in which that contro1 is imp1emented.

By reference

to Figure 4 , 1inearity can be achieved by cutting a circ1e
into pieces and 100king at one linear causa1ity at a time.
Moreover , defining communication either by reference to a
particu1ar technology , te1evision for examp1e , or focusing
。n

what is conventiona11y conceived of as messages ,

traditiona1 communication researchers tend to omit what does
not fit such techno1ogies or conventions and embed
themse1ves thereby in the 1arger system in ways that
coincide with dominant institutiona1 interests in this
system (see 1eft diagram in Figure 5).
There are of course critica1 voices in communication
research.

But those who question mere1y the ends toward

which contro1 is emp10yed continue to support the equation
。f

communication and contro1 and contribute litt1e

。vercome

t。

the he1p1essness , distrust , fear and oppression

this equation u1timate1y encourages regard1ess of the
critics ’ intentions.
The proposed framework takes two steps away from this
dominant tradition in communication research.

The first

1ies in the cybernetic proposal of viewing mu1tip1e
communication 1inks as networks , tracing its paths not just
from one mode to another but a1so back to it.
Cyberneticians have found recursive processes in such
networks to be far more interesting units of ana1ysis for
they shed 1ight on the se1f-referential dynamics , eigenbehaviors , rea1ity constructions , etc.

,

a11 of which escape
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the study and aggregation of linear communication links
between any two modes.

This emphasis on circularity neither

localizes and supports manipulative efforts nor does it lead
to a search for ultimate controllers , foundationalist
principles or prime movers.

It always starts from and leads

back to the constituents of a system (see the center diagram
in Figure 5).
The second step away from the traditional preoccupation
with control is accomplished by formally enabling
communication researchers to participate in their own
constructions.

The cybernetics of cybernetics for

communication research or a cybernetic epistemology realizes
cognitive autonomy to be equally fundamental for both , the
social scientists that create theories of society and the
people that occur in and practice these constructions.

As

seen in the right diagram in Figure 5 , this is not a mere
addition or extension , like adding another node to an
already large network.

It puts the communication

researchers as an active participant right into the selfreferential mass communication process they are observing.
It realizes that the act of communicating about observations
also is an act of creating the phenomena being described and
it suggests a new connection between language use and the
cognitive constitution of society.
。 ntoaenesis 으.f .ê.르 lf vers브프 으낀t으L으요y.

The naturalistic

tradition of science calls for describing reality the way it
is or was before it was observed or "tampered" with by
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scientific observers.
。ntology

It considers an observer-independent

the only meaningful object of scientific inquiry

and all influences on it as frustrating this aim and biasing
its results.

We cling to this tradition through our

methodological commitments as if it were the only way for
the social sciences to proceed.

Already the equation of

communication and control , the belief in the ability of
someone to cause others to think in ways they may not want
to , bears the dilemma between describing the purposive
tendencies of networks versus what exists.

This dilemma is

conventionally resolved by taking scientific observers out
。f

the picture they are

paintin연

and rendering them as

superior , detached and value-free beings

wh 。 샌효y.!l으ξ 르낀ter

t뇨g 띤g흐 ld 으.f ot뇨gζE 댄브드h le흐흐 ζ다르후.:t: Q쁘!l.

I am suggesting this 19th Century philosophy of science
to be a trap , appropriate at best to distant astronomical
。bjects ，

no longer capable of contributing to a society with

enhanced communication and near universal participation but
conveniently supported by those social organizations whose
institutions benefit from disabling social scientists from
actively participating in a society that

~。 ntinuallv 으 re효호르E

르E역 re으E르흐호으흐 으ζ 겐르ke프 후후E르 lf .

To take an extreme case , naive materialism regards
matter and energy or the mode of production and consumption
。f

tangible goods as the decisive determinants of social

life (as if it mattered to copper whether it is cast into a
bullet or applied to a computer chip , or as if socialist and
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capitalist systems would automatically emerge from different
technologies of production).
matter matters.

This is not to deny that

It does indeed sustain living organisms and

consequently also the social organizations involving them.
But matter , energy and money by itself can not and do not
have the specificity to determine the particular
。 rganizational

forms that do arise as a consequence of a

recursive processing of information.

Not only is

information different from matter or energy , as wiener
(1948)

,

Bateson (1972) and many others have insisted , living

。 rganisms ，

social organizations and social systems largely

determine their own pattern , are embedded in their own
histories , contain their own explanations or inform
themselves through the circu1arities of their own networks.
To look for determinisms outside ourselves in an
"objective material substrate" , in pleroma , is to belay our
modern but nevertheless common experiences that we can ,
within physical constraints , make different things happen
and that we can participate , by our very ability

t。

communicate with others , in continuously shaping the
realities we 1ive in.

Reality constructions built upon

unidirectional determinisms not only absolves scientists
from taking responsibilities for their theories and research
findings , but also blinds them from seeing the ontogenetic
consequences of their own communications and disables them
from making relevant contributions to an

evolvin양

society.

In contrast , the proposed framework for institutiona1
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analysis takes a dynamic notion of communication as a
starting point , carries it through to its self-application
and encourages communication researchers to be responsibly
involved in a process of continuous genesis.
E으으L으요Y.Y.르ζ프요흐 꾀후흐흐르k르nh으L후흐ill.

Social organizations

in general and mass-media systems in particular probably are
more heterarchical and self-directed to begin with then we
are willing to see.

In fact , we like to see pattern even in

the face of obvious randomness and project dependencies
where there aren ’ t any.

For this reason I took ecology as

an initial and perfectly reasonable model for how people in
。 rganizations

can interact with each other recursively

without requiring central control or a global understanding.
I also suggested that in the presence of public
communication , an ecology of social organizations tends

t。

institutionalize coordination and erodes into a social
system.

This emerging holism is a natural consequence of

social self-reflection , the workings of the mass-media ,
global interests including scientific inquiries into massmedia systems and institutions , all of which compete for
institutionalizing some kind of consensual practice or
another.

with reference to the stipulation given above ,

there are two forms of mistaken holism that can enter and
transform a mass-media system as well:

personification and

。bjectification.

Personificati 。n

involves projecting human qualities

naturally multifarious , complex and therefore only partly

t。
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understandable social organizations.

In communication

research this has taken the form of conspiracy theories , for
example , whose proponents interpret every seemingly unfair
event , e.g.

,

the unequal distribution of goods , services and

information throughout the world , as evidence of corporate
intentions or imperialistic designs.

Personification may

also take the form of a reductionist search for a single
controlling principle , plan ,

g。、rerning

elite or leader ,

thought to have the immense power to coordinate people ,
events and economies to achieve its hidden objectives.
Personification is evident in language use , metonymy in
particular.

It can offer simplistic explanations , shifts

collective responsibility to convenient scapegoats ,
charismatic leaders or super-natural beings , and frustrates
taking individual responsibility for participating in
communication networks that constitute what personification
veils.
Obiectificati 。n

arises in characterizing social systems

and organizations as composite unities whose members derive
their existence from the larger whole of which they are seen
as parts , are subordinate to its function and are , by a
correct but dangerous extension of this logic , dispensable
in that organization ’ s ontology.

In such characterizations ,

analogies to biological organisms are common and general
systems theory with its built-in preference for hierarchical
explanations is prone to this mistaken holism as well.
Examples of objectifications are found in statements like
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"the whole is more than the sum of its parts ," beliefs in
super-individual qualities , explanations in terms of
unquestionable

。、rer-arching

values , and finally in legal or

popular constructions of social institutions as entities
whose objectivity is entirely independent of their human
constituents.
Objectification is particularly prevalent in analyses
。 f .t뇨g

mass-media system (as if there would be only

으ne

account)

,

Q브I흐후날g

(as if its constituents had no voice of their own)

seeking to establish its organization from the

and explaining the behavior of its components as
subordinated to an abstract

。、rerall

principle of unknown location.

objective , value or

Such objectifications fail

to see institutions as embodied in and interactively
maintained by the human constituents of such systems , make
no allowance for these constituents to have cognitive
abilities similar to those scientific observers claim for
themselves , especially regarding their creative
participation , and are unable to describe communication as
(recursive) processes through which a system becomes
constituted as meaningful prototypes.

Analyses based on

such mistaken holisms would therefore have to be considered
invalid by my stipulations.

In such constructions , the

institutionalization of personifications may be simplistic
and diversionary but the institutionalization of
。bjectifications

tends to suppress awareness of social

participation , creates respect for abstract system
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principles nobody can call to question and legitimizes
super-individual powers behind which oppressive structures
can conveniently hide.
The framework sketched here is intended to be sensitive
to and reveal these dangers.

Based on the belief that

nobody would consciously submit to oppression or opt to be
confined into undesirable cognitive traps ,

it suggests that

the analysts of mass-media systems and institutions see
themselves as part of the system their description may bring
forth , shape or create , commit themselves to live in it and
in anyone ’ s place.
Conclusion
When asked to apply their own theories of communication
to themselves , traditional communication researchers must
become painful1y aware of their own schizophrenia , living in
two distinct and conflicting worlds , the world their
theories describe , in which people are constructed largely
as trivial machines of sorts , (Krippendorff , 1986)

,

and the

world of cognitive competence and academic freedom in which
researchers can invent and test any theory imaginable.
Resolving this pathology by seeing themselves as part of a
system their research informs entails a new epistemology in
which the validity of theories is decided at least in part
in competition for consensual practice , and the taking of
responsibility for the ensuing reality construction becomes
a requirement.

It is my contention that social scientists
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in general and communication researchers in particular have
an obligation to guard against inhuman theories and research
results in their own midst and in the system of their
concern , wherever these constructions of reality may come
from.

Demystification has been a historical mission of

science.

To reveal dehumanizing communication theories and

practices is a mere continuation of this critical mission.
It is informed by new insights that human nature and
communication is intricately intertwined and , after the
invention of the mass-media , all embracing.
has claimed this connection repeatedly.

George Gerbner

This paper merely

unfolds the radical consequences of a different perspective
and projects them into yet uncharted domains.
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